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LEGAL ETHICS, COMMERCIAL PRACTICE,




The American Bar Association ("ABA") Commission on Ethics 20/20 (the
"Commission"), broadly charged with modernizing the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (the "Model Rules"), recently circulated for comment
revised draft resolutions' in respect of Model Rule 1.7.2 Rule 1.7 is one of a
series of conflicts-of-interest rules codified in the Model Rules. 3 In a move that
stands to impact the application of all such conflicts-of-interest rules, the
Commission recommends that the ABA amend Rule 1.7 to allow a lawyer and
client to agree that a representation will be governed by the conflicts rules of a
particular jurisdiction, provided that certain requirements are met . Specifically,
the attorney would be required to obtain the client's "informed consent,"
confirmed in writing. Additionally, under the proposed amendments, a lawyer
and client would be required to choose the law of a jurisdiction that has a
sufficient nexus to the representation, and the resulting application of such
jurisdiction's conflicts-of-interest rules must not result in the application of a
rule to which informed client consent is not permitted under the rules of the
jurisdiction that would otherwise apply to the representation.6 As a result, the
chosen law would govern the analysis of all potential conflicts, including
* Assistant Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. I owe a debt of gratitude to
the student editors of the Northern Kentucky Law Review for inviting me to speak at the recent
symposium, "Legal Ethics for the Transactional Lawyer," and for careful editing of this essay.
1. ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20, Revised Draft Resolution for Comment- Model Rule 1.7
Conflict of Interest (Sept. 18, 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/ethics_2020/20120918_ethics2020choice of rule model rule1 7_comment draftfi
naljposting.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter ABA Draft Resolution].
2. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2012).
3. See id.
4. ABA Draft Resolution, supra note 1, at 1.
5. Id. A previous draft would have required that the attorney advise the client to seek independent
counsel regarding any choice of law agreement. ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20, Revised Draft Resolution
for Comment- Model Rule 1.7 (July 11, 2012), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/2012071 1_third draftresolutio
ns and report_conflicts and choice of law.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter July ABA Draft Resolution].
6. ABA Draft Resolution, supra note 1, at 1.
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imputation of conflicts within law firms under Model Rule 1.10,7 except that it
cannot provide a safe harbor with respect to conflicts that would have been
nonwaivable absent the choice of law agreement.'
According to the Commission's report, the proposal to allow conflicts-
specific choice of law agreements is intended to respond to the demands faced
by commercial attorneys in the interstate and international legal marketplace,
where clients, engagements, and their attendant conflicts often straddle multiple
jurisdictions with inconsistent conflicts rules.9 Soliciting input from practicing
attorneys and related interest groups, the Commission weighed the realities of
the modem legal landscape and identified a need for "certainty,
1°
"uniformity,"'' and "predictability"'12 in the law governing conflicts of interest.' 3
And, although the Commission stopped short of creating a bright-line rule 14 -
instead drafting a set of standards that must be applied to each unique set of
circumstances - the Commission chose to incorporate the revisions into the text
of Rule 1.7 in an effort to provide sure guidance.15
However, the interests identified by the Commission in support of the
amendments are markedly different from the interests that historically drove the
ABA's promulgation of attorney conflicts rules. Since their initial promulgation,
the attorney conflicts provisions of the Model Rules have been anchored in
client-centered interests.1 6 Generally, conflicts rules have been firmly rooted in
7. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2012).
8. ABA Draft Resolution, supra note 1, at 1.
9. ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20, Draft for Comment Report-Model Rule 1.7 Conflict of
Interest at 1-2 (Sept. 18, 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/ethics_2020/20120918_ethics_2020choice of rule model rule17 comment d
raftfinalposting.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter ABA Draft Report].
10. Id. at 1. The report provides, in pertinent part: "The Commission's proposal, if adopted,
could mitigate some of the uncertainty."
11. The Commission references a goal of uniformity in the nomenclature for the relevant
working group. Id. (referring to the "Uniformity, Choice of Law, and Conflicts of Interest Working
Group").
12. Id. at 5 ("The Commission's proposal is intended to provide more predictability to clients
and their lawyers by permitting them to agree in advance to be bound by the conflict rules of a
particular jurisdiction."); see also ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20, For Comment: New Drafts
Regarding Choice of Rule Agreements for Conflict of Interest and Choice of Law Issues Associated
with Fee Division Between Lawyers in Different Firms (Sept. 18, 2012), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics- 2020/20120918 -ethics 20 20
co chair cover memocomment drafts on fee divisionmodel rule1 7_finaljposting.authche
ckdam.pdf [hereinafter Cover Memo] ("[The choice of law agreements contemplated by the
amendments to Rule 1.7] could help lawyers and their clients predict with more accuracy than
Model Rule 8.5(b) (Choice of Law) allows").
13. ABA Draft Report, supra note 9, at 1.
14. Id.
15. In a very early draft of the proposed revisions, the new language was added to a Comment
and the text of Rule 1.7 was unchanged. Id. at 2.
16. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
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the principles of fairness, loyalty, and independent judgment, which interests
tend to support broad prohibitions against conflicted representations. 7 Where
the Model Rules have permitted exceptions, drafters cited both a need to
improve access to legal services in remote or underserved communities, and to
respect client autonomy. 8 In stark contrast, the proposed revisions to the Model
Rules' conflicts provisions seem to reflect attorney-focused and market-oriented
interests. 19 And, although the Commission suggests that attorneys and clients
will be benefited by, and have a need for, greater certainty, uniformity, and
predictability in attorney conflicts rules, the benefits of the proposed
amendments seem likely to accrue most directly to attorneys and large law firms
serving as intermediaries in the interstate and international market for legal
services. 2°
The Commission's black letter approach and its many references to
certainty, predictability, and uniformity are also deeply reminiscent of a broader
trend in commercial law that I've previously written about: what I call the
"Certainty Imperative." 2' The Certainty Imperative is a rapidly spreading and
deeply entrenched rhetoric, 22 pursuant to which certain vague value concepts are
used to justify the adoption of laws and policies that advance the interests of
large commercial institutions.23  By anchoring statutory changes and legal
decisions in auspiciously noble goals, such as the achievement of greater
"certainty," "predictability, '24 and "uniformity,, 25 the Certainty Imperative shifts
focus away from or even completely masks outcomes that are inconsistent with
other important societal goals, such as fairness and equity in a particular case.
Indeed, as one commentator warns, "[a] number of risks are inherent in a crude
reliance on ... unanalyzed value-concepts such as legal certainty ... [T]here is
the obvious danger that the concept of 'legal certainty' becomes fetishized, and
stands in the way of any real evaluation of the merits of law reform. 26
In this Essay, I caution the ABA to ensure that recent reform efforts, such as
those that have generated the proposed amendments to Rule 1.7, remain firmly
anchored in the important, client-centered interests of fairness, loyalty, and
independent judgment, and do not reflect the rampant, fetishized Certainty
17. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.7, cmt. 1 (2012).
18. See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
19. See ABA Draft Report, supra note 9, at 1.
20. See id. at 2.
21. Diane Lourdes Dick, Confronting the Certainty Imperative in Corporate Finance
Jurisprudence, 2011 UTAH L. REv. 1461, 1466 (2011).
22. Id. at 1473.
23. Id. at 1474.
24. Id. at 1475.
25. Id.
26. Joanna Perkins, Legal Certainty and the Role of the Financial Markets Law Committee, 2
CAP. MKTS. L.J. 155, 163 (2007).
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Imperative that has dominated commercial law in recent decades. Even more, I
challenge rule makers to carefully monitor the practice of supporting legal
reforms with inexplicit references to certainty, predictability, and uniformity.
By engaging on a deeper level with the application of these value concepts to
the proposed amendments to Rule 1.7, legal scholars, rule drafters, and
policymakers in legal ethics and commercial law can help to ensure that the
Certainty Imperative does not take root in the law governing attorney conduct.
This Essay proceeds as follows: Part II briefly describes Rule 1.7 and related
attorney conflicts rules, along with the Commission's proposed amendments
thereto. This Part concludes with a discussion of the goals and interests
identified by the Commission in proposing amendments to Rule 1.7. Further
exploring certainty, uniformity, and predictability as value concepts, Part III
describes the Certainty Imperative as a dominant paradigm in commercial law.
Part IV more closely examines the Commission's references to certainty,
predictability, and uniformity, and questions whether the Certainty Imperative is
becoming similarly entrenched in the law governing attorney conduct. Part IV
also attempts to reconcile the goals of certainty, predictability and uniformity
with more traditional interests that underlie attorney ethics rules, and notes areas
of potential conflict. Part V concludes.
II. BACKGROUND: MODEL RULE 1.7
Rule 1.7 is part of a larger uniform set of standards intended to serve as a
model for state regulatory law governing the legal profession.27 The ABA
originally adopted the Model Rules in August 1983, replacing the 1969 Model
Code of Professional Responsibility. 28 To date, attorney licensing authorities in
forty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have
adopted codes of professional responsibility that are based on the Model Rules
as initially published by the ABA.29  Not every state has adopted all the
subsequent amendments. 30 The ABA has made periodic revisions to the Model
Rules, with the most substantial redrafting taking place in 2002.31 The ABA
27. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2012).
28. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, History (2000).
29. Alphabetical List of States Adopting Model Rules, AMERICANBAR.ORG,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/publications/modelrules-of profe
ssionalconduct/alpha list state adopting model rules.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2013). California
has not adopted the Model Rules.
30. Chronological List of States Adopting Model Rules, AMERICANBAR.ORG,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/publications/model_rules-of profe
ssionalconduct/chrono list stateadoptingmodel rules.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).
31. ABA CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, 1982-2005, RULE 1.7 - CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CURRENT
CLIENTS ( 2006) [hereinafter A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
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Commission on Ethics 20/20's proposed revisions, if adopted, would constitute
the most substantial revisions to the Model Rules since 2002.
Rule 1.7, which pertains to conflicts that have the potential to impact current
clients, is the first in a series of Model Rules addressing attorney conflicts of
interest." Model Rule 1.8 addresses specific, personal-interest conflicts that can
arise with respect to current clients.33 Model Rule 1.9 addresses conflicts that
can arise in respect of former clients.34 And Model Rule 1.10 sets forth the
mechanisms by which conflicts can be imputed to attorneys within the same law
firin.
35
Generally speaking, Rule 1.7 prohibits an attorney from engaging in a
representation where the client's interests will be "directly adverse" to the
interests of another client or where there is a "significant" risk that the
representation will be "materially limited" by the attorney's "responsibilities to
another client, a former client or a third person, or by a personal interest of the
lawyer," unless each client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, and the
attorney reasonably believes that assumption of the new representation will not
adversely impact any client.36 The requirement that affected clients give
informed consent means the attorney must provide adequate disclosure of the
potential legal and practical effects of both the waiver and the proposed
representation.37 Although most conflicts, including future conflicts, can be
waived by clients under the rule,38 certain conflicts are deemed to be inherently
nonwaivable. 39 For instance, an attorney may not represent directly adverse
litigants, notwithstanding the clients' willingness to provide consent.4 °
Although the ABA has made periodic revisions to the Model Rules, the
substance and spirit of Rule 1.7 has remained fairly consistent over the years. In
fact, the text of the rule was not changed at all in the first nineteen years
following its initial promulgation, and, in that same period, the comments were
revised only to include a sentence addressing the practice of conflicts-checking.4'
In 2002, the rule underwent significant redrafting, to clarify the operation of the
rule and to strengthen its expression of the important interests sought to be
42advanced. However, although the 2002 revisions dramatically changed the text
32. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, 1.8, 1.9 & 1.10 (2012).
33. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (2012).
34. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (2012).
35. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2012).
36. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2012).
37. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) (2012) (defining "informed consent").
38. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt.22 (2012).
39. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(2)-(3), cmts. 14, 16, and 17 (2012).
40. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(3) (2012).
41. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, History (2000).
42. ABA Comm'n on Evaluation of the Rules of ProflI Conduct, Report with Recommendation
to the House of Delegates, Reporter's Explanation of Changes to Model Rule 1.7 (Aug. 2001),
2013]
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of both the rule and the comments, most of the changes were not meant to be
substantive in nature; 43 rather, they were intended merely to provide
amplification and clarification of the existing substantive rules.
44
As the comments to Rule 1.7 articulate, particularly as amplified by the 2002
amendments, the rule is designed to protect important, client-centered interests
of fairness, loyalty, and independent judgment.45 In particular, Comment 1
explains, "[l]oyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the
lawyer's relationship to a client. 4 6 Although it may seem contrary to these
interests that the rule provides a mechanism whereby clients may waive conflicts
(thereby allowing attorneys to represent directly adverse interests in certain
cases), ABA reports from the early 1980s reveal that the drafters sought to
protect clients in less populated areas, where there was limited access to legal
services.47 The drafters believed that a blanket prohibition on all representations
to the extent that the attorney is also representing an adversely situated client
would only further exacerbate the obstacles that many clients already face in
remote or rural areas.48  Additionally, client waiver provisions of this sort
promote the important goal of client autonomy.49
Of course, much has changed in the last thirty years, and the drafters' early
interest in the needs of small-town clients has given way to modern focus on the
unique issues that arise in an increasingly multijurisdictional, cross-border
practice environment. While the profession's shifting focus was foreshadowed
by numerous articles in professional journals in the 1990s and early 2000s
addressing cross-border practice,5° the modem sea of change is most clearly
reflected in the ABA's decision in 2000 to convene a Commission on
Multijurisdictional Practice to study potential reforms to the Model Rules.5' In
fact, certain of the 2002 amendments, such as the revisions to Rules 5.5 and 8.5,
were in response to this commission's research findings.52 Similarly, just as the
ABA has taken a deep interest in the cross-border nature of modern legal
available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/
policy/ethics_2000_commission/e2krulel 7rem.html [hereinafter Reporter's Explanation of
Changes to Model Rule 1.7].
43. The 2002 amendments required that informed consent be "confirmed in writing." Id.
44. Carl A. Pierce, Ethics 2000: What That Means for Business Lawyers: The Provisions, 12
Bus. L. TODAY 48 (2002).
45. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. 1 (2012).
46. Id.
47. A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 31, at 2.
48. Id.
49. See Fred C. Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts of Interest, 108 YALE L. J. 407, n.25 (1998).
50. See, e.g., Barrie Althoff, Multijurisdictional Practice, 2002 PROF. LAW. 83, 85 (2002);
William T. Barker, Extrajurisdictional Practice by Lawyers, 56 Bus. LAW. 1501, 1502-03 (2001).




practice, so, too, has the ABA evidenced a growing interest in the application of
the Model Rules to the transactional environment.53 Indeed, this emerging
interest is clearly reflected in the 2002 revisions to Rule 1.7. For instance, the
2002 amendments added Comment 7, which explains how directly adverse
conflicts might arise in transactional practice.54
In the years following the 2002 amendments, the ABA has continued to
study the application of the Model Rules to an increasingly cross-border,
multijurisdictional, and highly sophisticated commercial practice environment.
In fact, the very decision to convene the Commission on Ethics 20/20 in 2009
was rooted in a desire to "perform a thorough review of the [Model Rules] and
the U.S. system of lawyer regulation in the context of advances in technology
and global legal practice developments. ' '55  The Commission's earliest work
products included issues papers on multijurisdictional practice 56 and on choice of
law in cross-border practice. 7
With respect to conflicts of interest, the latter report identified several
scenarios in which application of the Model Rules yielded uncertain outcomes
due to the complex, cross-border nature of modern practice.5 8 For instance, the
report provided a hypothetical in which a single firm maintains offices in two
jurisdictions: an attorney in the firm's New York office represents a client in a
transactional matter, while an attorney in the firm's Country Q office seeks to
commence a new representation that would oppose the existing client in an
unrelated matter.5 9 Under the conflicts of interest rules in Country Q, the new
representation would be permissible even without client consent because the
New York attorney's conflict would not be imputed to the attorney in Country
Q. 60 However, Model Rule 1.10, as adopted in New York, treats all of the firm's
lawyers as one person for conflicts purposes. 6 1 Accordingly, the attorney in
53. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
54. A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 31, at 26.
55. About the Comm'n, AMERIcANBAR.ORG, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_
responsibility/aba commission on ethics_20 20.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2012).
56. Memorandum from ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20, Working Group on Uniformity,
Choice of Law, and Conflicts of Interest, For Comment: Issues Paper Concerning
Multjurisdictional Practice to ABA Entities, Courts, Bar Associations (state, local, specialty, and
international), Law Schools, Disciplinary Agencies, Individuals, and Entities (Mar. 29, 2011),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/abor-law/meetings/20l 1/
int/multijurisdictional_practice.authcheckdam.pdf.
57. Memorandum from ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20, Working Group on Uniformity,
Choice of Law, and Conflicts of Interest, Issues Paper: Choice of Law in Cross Border Practice
(Jan. 18, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/201 l-build/
professional responsibility/20111801 .authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter Issues Paper].
58. Id. at 2-4.
59. Id. at 3.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 3; see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2012).
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Country Q would need to obtain informed consent from the client in order to
proceed with the representation.62 The report concluded the hypothetical with a
query: "Can [the attorney in Country Q] undertake the engagement?"
63
Addressing the choice of law question, the report noted that it is unclear under
the current rules whether attorneys can specify "in their original engagement
letters with their clients that the conflicts rules in a designated jurisdiction (or in
the Model Rules) would govern their relationship."
64
Other attorney interest groups have raised similar concerns about the
potential inconsistencies in attorney conflicts provisions of the Model Rules, and
have called for greater certainty and uniformity. For instance, Attorneys'
Liability Assurance Society, Inc., the nation's leading provider of attorney
malpractice insurance for large law firms, remarked: "one of the challenges
facing lawyers and clients when they undertake legal matters across multiple
jurisdictions is the differing rules of professional conduct and, in particular,
differing rules on conflicts of interest that must be observed in the
representation. '65 Similarly, attorneys serving on the Law Firm General Counsel
Roundtable, an association comprised of general counsel and risk managers of
more than thirty large law firms, recently protested "the lack of a single, uniform
set of rules governing professional conduct across the country-a lack that often
results in conflicting, inconsistent, and unpredictable results from one
jurisdiction to another[.],,
66
The Commission's proposed amendments to Rule 1.7 are intended to
respond to criticisms of this sort, and to provide enhanced certainty, uniformity,
and predictability in the law governing attorney conflicts. As described above,
the Commission recommends that the ABA amend Rule 1.7 to allow a lawyer
and client to agree that a representation will be governed by the conflicts of
interest rules of a particular jurisdiction, provided that certain requirements are
met.67 Specifically, the attorney would be required to obtain the client's
"informed consent," confirmed in writing, to the choice of law decision.
68
Additionally, under the proposed amendments, a lawyer and client would be
required to choose the law of a jurisdiction that has a sufficient nexus to the
62. Issues Paper, supra note 57.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20, Comments on Revised Draft Proposal on Model Rule 1.7
(Choice of Rule Agreements for Conflicts of Interest) 2 (Aug. 15, 2012), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics2020/ethics20 20_comments/
alascommentsrevisedmodel rule_1_7.authcheckdam.pdf (submitted by Attorneys' Liability
Assurance Society, Inc., a Risk Retention Group).
66. James W. Jones & Anthony E. Davis, In Defense of a Reasoned Dialogue About Law
Finns and Their Sophisticated Clients, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 589, 590 (2012).
67. ABA Draft Resolutions, supra note 1, at 1.
68. Id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (c)(1) (2012).
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representation, and would not be permitted to use the choice of law mechanism
to bypass a local rule that would render a conflict nonwaivable.69
Agreements of this sort would stand at the intersection of two exceedingly
complex areas of the law- conflicts of law and choice of law-where clients
are unlikely to have previous experience. Yet the most recent draft of the
proposed amendments omits an earlier draft's requirement that the lawyer
encourage the client to seek independent counsel with respect to a choice of law
agreement.7 ° In many cases, absent guidance from independent counsel,
"informed consent" may not be particularly meaningful.
The Commission's publications cast light on how these choice of law
agreements will likely manifest in practice. For instance, although the proposed
amendments speak of a choice of law "agreement" between the lawyer and
client,71 in practical terms the choice of law decision is unlikely to be manifested
in a free-standing, choice of law contract between the attorney and client.72
Rather, as the Commission's issues paper suggests, 73 the "agreement" is likely to
be included as a sentence or two within the initial engagement letter. Indeed,
this is currently a popular method among law firms for obtaining advance
waivers from clients.74
The danger is that these agreements may expose clients to conflicts rules that
provide less stringent loyalty obligations than would otherwise govern the
representation. Yet concerns of this sort appear to be neglected, while the
Commission's reports focus on the proposed amendments' ability to deliver
certainty, uniformity, and predictability.75 Of course, to the extent that
"certainty" in this context simply refers to a person's ability to predict the
jurisdiction whose law will apply to any attorney conflicts issues, it is
tautological to say that the proposed amendments will enhance certainty for
lawyers and their clients. Clearly, there is a benefit to lawyers and law firms
when they can identify with certainty the conflicts rules that will apply to any
given representation. Without a doubt, this is why law firm general counsels and
attorney malpractice insurance providers have lobbied for increased certainty.
But what is the benefit to be gained by clients from the certainty, uniformity, and
predictability offered by the proposed amendments? To be sure, in a world of
continued uncertainty, attorneys would be forced to err on the side of caution by
69. Id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (c)(3)(4) (2012).
70. See July ABA Draft Resolution, supra note 5.
71. ABA Draft Resolution, supra note 1, at 1; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(c)(4)
(2012).
72. See infra notes 73 and 74 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
74. See generally Michael J. DiLernia, Advance Waivers of Conflicts of Interest in Large Law
Firm Practice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETrncs 97 (2009).
75. ABA Draft Report, supra note 9, at 5.
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seeking informed consent from their clients to any potential conflict, taking into
account a range of potential conflicts rules that might apply. Such an outcome is
arguably beneficial to clients to the extent that it provides them with increased
disclosures and a higher degree of loyalty from their attorneys. Until we have a
clear sense as to how certainty, uniformity, and predictability in the attorney
conflicts rules might benefit clients, there is a danger that these value concepts
might be used as mere rhetoric to cloak reforms that ultimately serve attorney
self-interest.
The following section explores these questions as they have emerged in
commercial law, with particular focus on the potentially dangerous consequences
that arise when the vague value concepts of certainty, uniformity, and
predictability are permitted to take root as rhetorical justifications for law
reform.
IlI. THE CERTAINTY IMPERATIVE IN COMMERCIAL LAW
In a previous work, I explored what I call the "Certainty Imperative" in
commercial law. 76 The Certainty Imperative is a legal paradigm that infuses the
goal of market stability into the deeply entrenched, normative theme of legal
certainty. 77 The Certainty Imperative manifests as a pervasive rhetoric in the
commercial law context, and most notably in finance and lending law. It
commonly takes the form of policy arguments that place tremendous emphasis
on the value concepts of certainty, predictability, and uniformity. 78 Typically
focused on the needs of large commercial institutions, the Certainty Imperative
promotes bright-line rules that provide "all prospective lenders the certainty that
is so important to the effective operation of markets, 79 or that deliver "guiding
principle[s] for those whose daily activities must be limited and instructed" by
laws and regulations governing commercial transactions." The Certainty
Imperative tends to manifest in rather spirited language: for instance, expressions
that a legal reform might "throw credit markets into confusion and destabilize
76. Dick, supra note 21, at 1466.
77. Id.
78. E.g., Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 652 (1988) (explaining that the securities market
"demands certainty and predictability"); In re Symons Frozen Foods Inc., 432 B.R. 290, 300
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2010) (resolving a conflict of laws question pertaining to statutory liens based
in part upon the court's belief that "the application of Washington law... is supported by its effect
of... creating certainty in the market").
79. In re Bulson, 327 B.R. 830, 844 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2005) ("[S]ome line must be drawn
so that the lenders generally can make rational decisions when underwriting loans .... [T]he
outcome... is at least one that a lender could have anticipated and adjusted for accordingly.").
80. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983) (declining to expand insider trading liability).
[Vol. 40:2
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[an] area of law,,8 1 or "disrupt orderly credit markets., 82 The Fourth Circuit
even suggested that a ruling adverse to the expectations of lenders83 might send
tremors through the industry, causing "untold and unknown consequences that
cannot now be fully foreseen," "undefinable instability," and even "widespread
confusion." 84  Adding further fuel to an already fiery verbiage, the Certainty
Imperative is frequently articulated in legal advocacy efforts in the commercial
law sector, manifesting in litigation briefs, lobbying efforts, and legislative
proposals.8 5
As noted above, the Commission on Ethics 20/20 repeatedly cites the
interests of certainty, uniformity, and predictability, using language that is
deeply reminiscent of the Certainty Imperative. 6 However, there is one
important distinction: the Commission repeatedly notes that these goals are
important to both attorneys and clients.8 7 In contrast, in the commercial law
context, expressions of the Certainty Imperative do not suggest that the
advancement of certainty, uniformity, and predictability offers direct benefits to
borrowers or consumers.88 Rather, courts and legislatures acknowledge that the
benefits of certainty, uniformity, and predictability accrue mainly to large
financial institutions and other market intermediaries. At the same time, they
81. Smith v. Anderson, 801 F.2d 661, 665 (4th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he loan transaction here
complied with the careful requirements of state and federal law. To supplement those requirements
with ones of our own devising would throw credit markets into confusion and destabilize this area
of law.").
82. Algemene Bank Nederland v. Hallwood Indus., Inc., 133 B.R. 176, 180-81 (W.D. Pa.
1991) (explaining that under a loan assumption agreement, the assignor remained liable to the
holder after the holder was unable to recover from the assignee because of involuntary bankruptcy;
to find otherwise "would not only be unwarranted but would also disrupt orderly credit markets").
83. Where the expectation of lenders is reasonable and based on an agency interpretation in a
particularly complex field of law. Cetto v. LaSalle Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 518 F.3d 263, 277 (4th Cir.
2008).
84. Id.
85. E.g., Todd C. Pearson, Note, Limiting Lender Liability: The Trend Toward Written Credit
Agreement Statutes, 76 MINN. L. REv. 295, 299-300 n.17-18 (1991) (citing legislative history of a
variety of credit-specific statutes of frauds); Growth and Development of the Derivatives Market:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int. Trade and Fin. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and
Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 6-7 (2005) (statement of Joseph P. Bauman, CEO, JB Risk
Consulting, LLC). Indeed, the Imperative's rhetoric is so pervasive that legislation in the financial
law realm at times includes the phrase "legal certainty" in its very title. See Legal Certainty for
Bank Products Act of 2000, 7 U.S.C. § 27a-f (2012) (providing that no over-the-counter derivative
contract shall be unenforceable under any federal or state law based on a failure to comply with the
Commodity Exchange Act).
86. Seesupra notes 10-12.
87. ABA Draft Report, supra note 9, at 5; Cover Memo, supra note 12, at 1.
88. See, e.g., A.I. Credit Corp. v. Gov't of Jamaica, 666 F. Supp. 629, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
("[O]ur holding could have a devastating financial impact ... [on the borrower]. But it is not the
function of a federal court ... to evaluate the consequences to the debtor of its inability to pay nor
the foreign policy or other repercussions .... Such considerations are properly the concern of other
governmental institutions.").
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intimate an indirect benefit that will flow to borrowers or consumers: the
willingness of financial institutions to lend. 9 For instance, in Sharon Steel
Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank,90 the Second Circuit succinctly summarized the
importance of uniformity in construing boilerplate provisions: "uniformity in
interpretation is important to the efficiency of capital markets." 91  The court
further explained:
[T]he creation of enduring uncertainties... would decrease the value of
all debenture issues and greatly impair the efficient working of capital
markets. Such uncertainties would vastly increase the risks and,
therefore, the costs of borrowing with no offsetting benefits either in the
capital market or in the administration 
of justice.
92
In other words, the Certainty Imperative in commercial law asserts that
borrowers and consumers ultimately benefit indirectly when the legal construct
provides certainty, uniformity and predictability in a manner that directly
benefits lenders. The following section explores these value concepts in the
context of attorney ethics, with a particular emphasis on the direct or indirect
benefits that clients can expect to receive when legal reforms are premised upon
the advancement of certainty, uniformity and predictability.
IV. AN EMERGING CERTAINTY IMPERATIVE IN THE LAW GOVERNING ATTORNEY
CONDUCT?
Is the Certainty Imperative taking root in the realm of attorney ethics?
Clearly, we see an emergence of the same unarticulated value concepts of
certainty, uniformity, and predictability. 93  Of course, to some extent the
Commission's heavy reliance on these value concepts may simply reflect a
studied reflection on broader commercial law issues, such as sophisticated cross-
border transactional practice and the increasingly global economy, where legal
certainty is the subject of much discourse.94  But the Commission's newly
articulated goals might also signal a more dangerous sea of change in attorney
ethics reform efforts, whereby unarticulated value concepts might be used as
rhetorical devices to support legal reforms that would fail under a more
traditional client-centered analysis.
89. Dick, supra note 21, at 1474.
90. 691 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1982).
91. Id. at 1048.
92. Id.
93. See supra notes 10-12.
94. ABA Draft Report, supra note 9, at 1.
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As a recent essay by legal ethics commentator Lawrence Fox suggests,
recent reform efforts might have already reached such a perilous point.95 In his
scathing review of proposals submitted to the Commission by the Law Firm
General Counsel Roundtable, Fox asserts that some reform participants have
chosen to sacrifice client loyalty in an effort to protect attorney economic
interests and to enable large law firms to practice law in a less restrained,
market-based manner. 96 Although the General Counsels' proposals claim to be
client-centered,97 Fox argues that the proposals radically reduce the duties owed
by an attorney to certain "sophisticated clients."98 In a published response to
Fox's critique, attorneys from the Law Firm General Counsel Roundtable
explain that the reforms are necessary to enable attorneys and large law firms to
compete in an increasingly global and competitive market for legal services. 99
The authors note that the "world of legal practice" has changed,100 and describe
the "mutual needs of sophisticated clients and their lawyers to be able - by
mutual consent and when they choose - to determine with certainty how the
conflict of interest rules should apply in their relationships."10' However,
consistent with the Commission's own vague use of "certainty" as a value
concept to support legal reform, the authors never articulate the direct benefits
that would accrue to clients from the increased certainty. 1
02
In fact, the response hints at an attorney and market focus, defending reform
proposals that are "grounded in the realities of today's complex and highly
competitive market for legal services, ' ' and noting the "evolving marketplace
in which lawyers actually live and work."'1 4 Finally, the response admits to a
"serious concern": "the burdens of unnecessarily restrictive regulations on the
practice of law."'1 5 In language reflecting a neoclassical economic analysis of
legal ethics rules, the authors note the process of deregulation that is already
underway in "many parts of the world, most notably in England," and note that
such "changes will liberate clients with global businesses and law firms not
constrained by the U.S. regulatory structure."' 1 6  The authors close with a
95. Lawrence Fox, The Gang of Thirty-Three: Taking the Wrecking Ball to Client Loyalty, 121
YALE L.J. ONLINE 567, 588 (2012).
96. See id. at 583-84.
97. Id. at 568 n.2 (summarizing the purportedly client-centric goals reflected by the reform
proposals).
98. Id. at 575-76.
99. Jones & Davis, supra note 66, at 598.
100. Id. at 590.
101. Id. at 591 (emphasis in original).
102. Id
103. Id. at 597.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 598.
106. Id.
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warning: "[u]nless the rules governing the practice of law in the United States
can be modified to be more in line with the prevailing norms in the rest of the
world, U.S.-based and qualified lawyers are likely to be constrained in their
ability to compete globally for legal business."'
0 7
A closer reading of the response to Fox's critique suggests an indirect
benefit that would purportedly accrue to clients when the law provides attorneys
and law firms with enhanced certainty, uniformity, and predictability.' °8 The
response suggests that the conflicts provisions of the Model Rules operate to
restrain today's ever-expanding large law firms in the market for legal services,
and that reforms are needed to provide increased certainty, uniformity, and
predictability to attorneys and law firms.' 09 And, just as the Certainty Imperative
in commercial law promises indirect benefits to borrowers and consumers in the
form of an increased willingness on the part of large commercial institutions to
engage in transactions, the response seems to suggest that, as an indirect benefit
to clients, attorneys will be more willing and able to serve in a broader range of
matters. These are undeniably attorney and market-focused interests, premised
on a belief that the rules governing attorney conduct should seek to advance the
needs of the attorneys and large law firms that serve as intermediaries in a highly
competitive and global market for legal services.
Notwithstanding its targeted mission to focus on the multijurisdictional
practice climate, the Commission was also charged with proposing revisions that
would serve the ABA's broader goals of "protecting the public; preserving the
core professional values of the American legal profession; and maintaining a
strong, independent, and self-regulated profession."" 0  Thus, the Commission,
and the ABA more broadly, ought to engage more deeply with the goals and
interests that motivate recent reform efforts, and ensure that they are consistent
with these broader aims. In particular, I challenge rule makers to carefully
monitor the emerging practice of supporting' legal reforms with inexplicit
references to certainty, predictability, and uniformity, and to ensure that legal
reform efforts remain firmly anchored in the important, client-centered interests
of fairness, loyalty, and independent judgment. Attorney and market-focused
reforms must be strictly scrutinized in a profession where it is a true privilege
and honor to serve clients. What is more, as the story of the Certainty Imperative
in commercial law reveals, there is a danger in allowing unarticulated value
concepts to become fetishized.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 597.
109. Id. at 594.
110. ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20, Introduction and Overview 1 (Aug. 2012), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20120508 ethics_20_20




The Commission on Ethics 20/20 was convened by the ABA to "perform a
thorough review of the [Model Rules] and the U.S. system of lawyer regulation
in the context of advances in technology and global legal practice
developments.""' As this mission statement suggests, much has changed in the
last thirty years. The practice of law is increasingly cross-border, involving
sophisticated transactions, complex technology, and greater competition. The
Commission was also charged with proposing revisions that would advance the
ABA's broader vision of "protecting the public; preserving the core professional
values of the American legal profession; and maintaining a strong, independent,
and self-regulated profession."'" 2 As the latter rulemaking goals suggest, it
remains a privilege and an honor to engage in the practice of law. What is more,
the latter and former rulemaking goals are not inherently inconsistent, so long as
the Commission remains focused on the traditional, client-centered interests that
serve as bedrock principles of legal ethics and does not allow unarticulated,
fetishized value concepts to divert reform efforts.
111. See About the Comm "n, supra note 55.
112. Introduction and Overview, supra note 110, at 1.
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